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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Bankruptcy-A'rroRNEY's FEES UNDER THE 1963 AMENDMENT To
§ 60(d) oF THE BANKRUPTCY Acr. Section 64(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy
Acti makes provision for counsel fees to be assessed in bankruptcy
cases:
S.. one reasonable attorney's fee for the professional services actually
rendered ... to the bankrupt in voluntary and involuntary cases, and
to the petitioning creditors in involuntary cases ...
Section 60(d), prior to the 1963 amendment provided:
If a debtor shall, directly or indirectly in contemplation of the filing
of a petition by or against him, pay money or transfer property to an
attorney . . . for services to be rendered, the transaction shall be re-
examined by the court on petition of the trustee or any creditor..._2
The first paragraph of the 1963 amendment3 now provides that the
court on its own motion may examine and determine reasonable counsel
fees, as well as by petition by the trustee or creditor of the bankrupt.
An additional paragraph was added to 60(d):
If, whether before or after filing, a debtor shall agree orally or in
writing to pay money or transfer property to an attorney at law after
the filing, the transaction may be examined by the court on its own
motion or shall be examined by the court on petition of the bankrupt
made prior to discharge and shall be held valid only to the extent or a
reasonable amount to be determined by the court, and any excess
obligation shall be cancelled, or if excess payment or transfer has been
made, returned to the bankrupt.
This amendment, and the reason for its enactment by Congress, was
discussed in Levin and Weintraub v. Rosenberg.4 Appellants, counsel
for the bankrupt, appealed reduction of their attorney's fees from $2,550
to $750 by the District Court. The fees had been reduced because the
size of the estate had been depleted by high administrative costs. Ap-
pellants contended that their drafted petition in bankruptcy had been
on file with the court for more than two years before any claim had
been instituted by the defendant trustees to have counsel fees reduced;
1. 11 U.S.C.A. S 104(a).
2. 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(d).
3. 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(d).
4. 330 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1964).
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they further alleged that defendant's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations under section 11 (e):
A receiver or trustee may, within two years subsequent to the date
of adjudication or within such further period of time as the Federal
or State law may permit, institute proceedings in behalf of the estate
upon any claim against which the period of limitation fixed by Federal
or State law had not expired at the time of the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy.5
The referee held that the 1963 amendment, authorizing the court to
review attorneys' fees on its own motion, was not subject to the statute
of limitations under section 11 (e). The Court of Appeals in deciding
whether the 1963 amendment was covered by the two year statutory
period, discussed the intent of Congress in amending section 60(d). In
Senate Report 144,6 the Committee on the Judiciary stated that the
amendment would serve "to strengthen the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act governing the review of attorneys' fees by the bankruptcy court." 7
The Committee revealed certain abuses which had been brought to its
attention during hearings on the proposed amendment: (1) Debtors
were signing notes for excessive fees in no asset or nominal asset cases,
since the allowable fee to the attorney would be small. (2) Attorneys
often failed to assess their own fees justly, or dispute those charged by
their associates. (3) Lesser claimants and general creditors were also
charged excessive fees, because the amount recovered would be small,
and the bankrupt's estate had been considerably expended by priority
claimants in many instances.
Appellants argued, however, that the court's investigation of counsel
fees on its own motion actually was derived from the power of the
bankrupt's trustee to file a claim for reduction of fees,-and the court,
therefore, should be subject to the same limitations as the trustees are
under section 11 (e). The court rejected this theory on two grounds:
(1) There is no provision under section 11 (e) which in any way pre-
vents the court from re-examining counsel fees. (2) Congressional intent,
manifested by the 1963 amendment to section 60 (d), was to expand the
5. 11 U.S.CA. § 29(e). "The two year period of limitation upon suit brought by
receivers and trustees now runs from the date of adjudication, but these officials may
also avail themselves of any longer periods of limitation provided by non-bankruptcy
laws." HANNA AND MAcLAcHLAN, THE BANKRUPTCY AcT, ANNOTATED 25 (7th Ed. 1961).
6. U.S. CoDE CONG. AND AMIX. ,N'ws 637, 88th Cong., First Sess. (1963).
7. Id. at 637.
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authority of the courts in reviewing counsel fees, not to limit it under
section 11 (e).
The court considered the amount of time spent on the case by the
appellants, and their professional reputation, but cited Rosenburg v.
United States8 in upholding reduction of their fees:
... Even though these professional services were well performed and
helpful, we think the only realistic course in bankruptcy collections is
that allowances must be limited-as they are by customary practice-
to a reasonable percentage of the recovery...
The term "reasonable fee" as stated in section 64(a) 1, has evoked
much comment from the courts respecting standards to be applied in
determining reasonable counsel fees. Now that section 60 (d) provides for
courts assessing fees on their own motion, attorneys' fees in bankruptcy
cases will be more subject to scrutiny than in the past, and criteria used
for their determination will become more apparent. Two cases, how-
ever, perhaps will serve as valuable guidelines to attorneys handling
bankruptcy matters. In Levin v. Barker,9 the court said:
Many elements may properly be taken ipto consideration in determin-
ing a reasonable fee for services rendered by an attorney [in bank-
ruptcy cases]. Among these may be named (1) the time spent; (2)
the intricacy of the questions involved; (3) the size of the estate; (4)
the opposition encountered; (5) the results obtained; and (6) the
economic spirit of the Bankruptcy Act.
Counsel fees in relation to the "economic spirit of the Bankruptcy Act"
were discussed in detail in In Re Consolidated Distributors, Inc.:10
It is most important in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act to
observe that the language of the Act makes it a duty of the courts
to see that the fees paid to the attorneys shall be "reasonable." We
construe the word "reasonable" in this connection to mean that the
allowance which can be made to an attorney for services rendered in
a bankruptcy proceeding must be such as will fairly compensate him
for the service he has rendered and from which the general body of
creditors has benefitted. In all cases the sine qua non of the allowance
8. 242 F.2d. 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1957).
9. 122 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 315 U.S. 813 (1941).
10. 298 Fed. 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1924).
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is the benefit the bankrupt's estate and its creditors have derived from
the services rendered.
The court concluded its opinion with a financial summary which
showed a balance of $4,200 out of gross assets of $19,000; against this
balance were claims of allowances for $5,500, and priority claims of
over $50,000. Nothing was available for general creditors. On the basis
of these figures, the court thought it was reasonable to reduce the ap-
pellants' fees from $2,500 to $750.
Bankruptcy courts under section 60(d) now have more latitude than
ever before in assessing fair and reasonable attorneys' fees. Levin and
Weintraub v. Rosenberg" involved a substantial reduction in fees, and
it is immediately evident that courts handling bankruptcy matters have
already strongly considered Congressional intent and the spirit of the
Bankruptcy Act-to assess fees so as to give the greatest benefit to the
creditors, and at the same time, to protect the bankrupt from further
depletion of his estate.
David Beach
Constitutional Law-FREEDOM OF RELIGIoN-HALLUCINOGENS: THE
RIGHT TO SIMULATED SPIRITUALIs M. The Native American Church
of California has no membership requirements, no church records, no
recorded theology, but has an estimated membership of 30,000-250,000
Indians. The religion of the Church embraces the consumption of
an hallucinogen, lophophora, better known as peyote. Lophophora
embodies the Holy Spirit and the partaker enters into contact with
the Deity. The clinical effects of the consumption of lophophora are
manifold. Varying with the individual, it ordinarily produces two
stages: in the first, it acts as a stimulant causing wakefulness with
physical and mental exhilaration, and, in the second, as a depressant
causing an intoxication with accompanying visions and hallucinations.
During a service, defendants in People v. Woody,' were apprehended
and charged with the unlawful possession of lophophora in violation of
Section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code.2 They pleaded not guilty,
11. Supra note 3.
1. People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964), reversing 35 Cal. Rptr. 708.
2. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, § 11500; § 11540 specifically prohibits the possession
of lophophora.
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